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Abstract
We consider a two-person trading game in continuous time whereby each
player chooses a constant rebalancing rule b that he must adhere to over [0, t]. If
Vt(b) denotes the final wealth of the rebalancing rule b, then Player 1 (the “nu-
merator player”) picks b so as to maximize E[Vt(b)/Vt(c)], while Player 2 (the
“denominator player”) picks c so as to minimize it. In the unique Nash equilib-
rium, both players use the continuous-time Kelly rule b∗ = c∗ = Σ−1(µ − r1),
where Σ is the covariance of instantaneous returns per unit time, µ is the drift
vector of the stock market, and 1 is a vector of ones. Thus, even over very
short intervals of time [0, t], the desire to perform well relative to other traders
leads one to adopt the Kelly rule, which is ordinarily derived by maximizing
the asymptotic exponential growth rate of wealth. Hence, we find agreement
with Bell and Cover’s (1988) result in discrete time.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Literature Review
Kelly (1956) obtained the eponymous Kelly rule (“Fortune’s Formula,” Poundstone
2010) by maximizing the asymptotic growth rate of one’s capital when gambling on
repeated horse races where the posted odds diverge from the true win probabilities.
Famously (cf. with Thorp 2017), the Kelly rule was employed by card counter Ed-
ward O. Thorp to size his bets at the Nevada blackjack tables. Thorp went on to
use the same principle (of the log-optimal constant-rebalanced portfolio) in money
management on Wall Street. For the general discrete time portfolio problem, the
Kelly investor willingly foregoes the tangency portfolio (of maximum Sharpe ratio)
in exchange for the highest possible asymptotic capital growth rate. Breiman (1961)
showed that a Kelly gambler will almost surely outperform any essentially different
strategy (by an exponential factor), and he has the shortest mean waiting time to
reach a distant wealth goal.
In a pair articles, Bell and Cover (1980, 1988) proved a short-term optimality
property of the discrete time Kelly rule. They show that the Kelly criterion emerges
as the solution of a wide class of “investment φ-games” where the goal is for one
investor to outperform the other (in the sense of an increasing function φ(•) of the
ratio of the two players’ final wealths). Both papers use an artifice whereby, before
the game itself, each player is allowed make a “fair randomization” of his initial dollar,
by exchanging it for any random variable distributed over [0,∞) whose mean is at
most 1.
1.2 Contribution
This paper studies a similar game in continuous time, where each player commits to
a rebalancing rule that must be used continuously over the interval [0, t]. The unique
Nash equilibrium (that constitutes a saddle point of the expected ratio of wealths
at t) is for both players to use the continuous time Kelly rule. This result, which
matches that of Bell and Cover (1988), holds for the general market with n correlated
stocks (i = 1, ..., n) in geometric Brownian motion. This being done, we show that
the continuous time Kelly rule is the basis for the solution of a “continuous time
investment φ-game” that is analogous to the discrete time version solved by Bell and
Cover.
2 Model
We consider a continuous time trading game between two players. There is a risk-free
bond whose price Bt := e
rt evolves according to dBt = rBt dt and a single stock whose
price St follows the geometric Brownian motion
dSt := St(µ dt+ σdWt), (1)
where µ is the drift, σ is the volatility, and Wt is a standard Brownian motion. At
t = 0 each player chooses a constant rebalancing rule b ∈ R that he must adhere to
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . A rebalancing rule b is a fixed-fraction betting scheme that maintains
the fraction b of wealth in the stock and 1 − b in the bond at all times. Let Vt(b)
denote the wealth at t of a $1 deposit into the rebalancing rule b. At instant t, the
trader holds bVt(b)/St shares of the stock and (1− b)Vt(b)e−rt units of the bond. This
portfolio will be held over the differential time step [t, t + dt], after which point it
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must be rebalanced again. The players are free to use any amount of leverage (b > 1
or b < 0), if desired.
Player 1 (the “numerator player”) chooses the rebalancing rule b ∈ R and Player
2 (the “denominator player”) chooses a rebalancing rule c ∈ R. We consider the
two-person, zero-sum game with payoff kernel pi(b, c) := E[VT (b)/VT (c)]. The numer-
ator player seeks to maximize the expected ratio of his final wealth to that of the
opponent’s. The denominator player seeks to minimize this quantity.
2.1 Payoff Computation
Each player’s wealth follows a geometric Brownian motion
dVt(b)
Vt(b)
= b
dSt
St
+ (1− b)dBt
Bt
= [r + b(µ− r)]dt+ bσdWt. (2)
Solving, we obtain
Vt(b) = exp{[r + b(µ− r)− σ2b2/2]t+ bσWt}. (3)
The ratio of final wealths is
Vt(b)
Vt(c)
= exp{[(µ− r)(b− c) + (c2 − b2)σ2/2]t+ (b− c)σWt}. (4)
Thus, since the ratio of final wealths is log-normally distributed (cf. Shonkwiler 2013),
we have, after simplification,
E
[
Vt(b)
Vt(c)
]
= exp{(µ− r − σ2c)(b− c)t}. (5)
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After a monotonic transformation, we may re-write the payoff kernel as
pi(b, c) := (µ− r − σ2c)(b− c), (6)
which is the exponential growth rate of E[Vt(b)/Vt(c)].
2.2 Equilibrium
Player 1’s best response correspondence is
b∗(c) =

+∞ if c < (µ− r)/σ2
R if c = (µ− r)/σ2
−∞ if c > (µ− r)/σ2
.
Player 2’s best response function is
c∗(b) =
1
2
(
b+
µ− r
σ2
)
. (7)
Thus, the unique Nash equilibrium is b∗ = c∗ = (µ− r)/σ2, which happens to be the
continuous time Kelly rule (cf. Luenberger 1998). Ordinarily, the Kelly (1956) rule is
derived by maximizing the asymptotic continuously-compounded capital growth rate
Growth Rate(b) := lim
t→∞
1
t
log Vt(b) = r + (µ− r)b− σ
2
2
b2. (8)
Hence, even over very short intervals of time [0, t], the desire to outperform other
traders in the market dictates the use of the Kelly rule b∗ := (µ − r)/σ2. We have
thus derived a short-term optimality property of the continuous time Kelly rule that
matches the results obtained by Bell and Cover (1988) in discrete time.
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2.3 Several Correlated Stocks
We extend the above result to the general stock market with n correlated stocks
(i = 1, ..., n) whose prices Sit follow the geometric Brownian motions (cf. Bjo˝rk 1998)
dSit := Sit(µi dt+ σi dWit), (9)
where µ := (µ1, ..., µn)
′ is the drift vector, σ := (σ1, ..., σn)′ is the vector of volatilities,
and Σ is the covariance matrix of instantaneous returns per unit time, e.g. Σij =
Cov(dSit/Sit, dSjt/Sjt)/dt. The Wit are correlated standard Brownian motions, with
ρij := Corr(dWit, dWjt) and Σij = ρijσiσj. We assume that Σ is invertible. In this
context, a rebalancing rule is a vector b := (b1, ..., bn)
′ ∈ Rn, where the gambler
continuously maintains the fixed fraction bi of wealth in stock i at all times. He keeps
the fraction 1−
n∑
i=1
bi of wealth in bonds. As in the univariate case, this permits the
freest possible use of leverage, if desired.
Each player’s final wealth Vt(b) follows the geometric Brownian motion
dVt(b)
Vt(b)
=
n∑
i=1
bi
dSit
Sit
+
(
1−
n∑
i=1
bi
)
dBt
Bt
= [r + (µ− r1)′b]dt+
n∑
i=1
biσidWit. (10)
The solution of this stochastic differential equation is
Vt(b) = exp
{
[r + (µ− r1)′b− b′Σb/2]t+
n∑
i=1
biσiWit
}
. (11)
This can be verified directly by applying Itoˆ’s Lemma for several diffusion processes
(cf. Wilmott 2001) to the function F (W1, ...,Wn, t) := exp{[r+(µ−r1)′b−b′Σb/2]t+
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n∑
i=1
biσiWi}. The ratio of final wealths is
Vt(b)
Vt(c)
= exp
{
(µ− r1)′(b− c) + (c′Σc− b′Σb)/2]t+
n∑
i=1
(bi − ci)σiWit
}
. (12)
Thus, the ratio of final wealths is log-normally distributed, with
E
[
Vt(b)
Vt(c)
]
= exp{(µ− r1− Σc)′(b− c)t}. (13)
After monotonic transformation, we obtain the simplified payoff kernel
pi(b, c) := (µ− r1− Σc)′(b− c). (14)
Player 1’s best response correspondence is
b∗i (c) =

+∞ if (Σc)i < µi − r
R if (Σc)i = µi − r
−∞ if (Σc)i > µi − r,
where (Σc)i :=
n∑
j=1
ρijσiσjcj is the i
th coordinate of the vector Σc. Assuming that Σ
is invertible, Player 2’s best response function is
c∗(b) =
1
2
[b+ Σ−1(µ− r1)]. (15)
Intersecting the best responses, we find that the unique Nash equilibrium is b∗ = c∗ =
Σ−1(µ − r1), which is the multivariate Kelly rule in continuous time. We thus have
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the identity
max
b∈R
min
c∈R
E
[
Vt(b)
Vt(c)
]
= min
c∈R
max
b∈R
E
[
Vt(b)
Vt(c)
]
= 1. (16)
Thus, since the Kelly rule b∗ is Player 1’s maximin strategy, we have E[Vt(b∗)/Vt(c)] ≥
1 for all c, and since the Kelly rule c∗ is Player 2’s minimax strategy, we have
E[Vt(b)/Vt(c∗)] ≤ 1 for all b.
3 Investment φ-Game
Based on the fact that the Kelly rule b∗ = c∗ guarantees E[Vt(b∗)/Vt(c)] ≥ 1 for all c
and E[Vt(b)/Vt(c∗)] ≤ 1 for all b, we can obtain a general result analogous to that of
Bell and Cover (1988). First, we need some definitions.
Definition 1. By a “fair randomization” of the initial dollar is meant a random
variable W with support [0,∞) and E[W] ≤ 1.
Definition 2. For any increasing function φ(•), the “primitive φ-game,” with value
vφ, is the two-person, zero-sum game with payoff kernel E[φ(W1/W2)], where player 1
chooses a fair randomization W1 and player 2 chooses a fair randomization W2. The
value of the primitive φ-game is vφ := sup
W1
inf
W2
E[φ(W1/W2)] = inf
W2
sup
W1
E[φ(W1/W2)].
The random wealths W1 and W2 are independent of each other.
Definition 3. For any increasing function φ(•), the “investment φ-game” is the two-
person, zero-sum game with payoff kernel E[φ{W1Vt(b)/(W2Vt(c))}], where player 1
chooses a rebalancing rule b and a fair randomization W1 of the initial dollar, and
player 2 chooses a rebalancing rule c and a fair randomization W2 of his initial dollar.
The random wealths W1 and W2 are independent of all stock prices and independent
of each other.
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Theorem 1. The investment φ-game has the same value vφ as the primitive φ-game.
In equilibrium, both players use the continuous-time Kelly rule b∗ := Σ−1(µ−r1), and
the players use the same minimax randomizations (W∗1,W
∗
2) that solve the primitive
φ-game.
Proof. First, we show that E[φ{W∗1Vt(b∗)/(W2Vt(c))}] ≥ vφ for any fair randomiza-
tion W2 and any rebalancing rule c, where b
∗ is the Kelly rule. Note that the quantity
W2Vt(c)/Vt(b
∗) ≥ 0 is a fair randomization, since E[Vt(c)/Vt(b∗)] ≤ 1. The inequality
E[Vt(c)/Vt(b∗)] ≤ 1 follows from direct substitution of b∗ := Σ−1(µ− r1) into the ex-
pected wealth ratio. Thus, since W∗1, is Player 1’s minimax solution in the primitive
φ-game, we must have E[φ{W∗1Vt(b∗)/(W2Vt(c))}] ≥ vφ.
Similarly, we show that E[φ{W1Vt(b)/(W∗2Vt(c∗))}] ≤ vφ for any fair random-
ization W1 and any rebalancing rule b, where c
∗ is the Kelly rule. Note that the
quantity W1Vt(b)/Vt(c
∗) ≥ 0 is a fair randomization, since E[Vt(b)/Vt(c∗)] ≤ 1. Thus,
since W∗2, is Player 2’s minimax solution of the primitive φ-game, we must have
E[φ{W1Vt(b)/(W∗2Vt(c∗))}] ≤ vφ.
Thus, we have shown that (W∗1, b
∗) forces the payoff to be ≥ vφ and (W∗2, c∗)
forces the payoff to be ≤ vφ when b∗ and c∗ are equal to the Kelly rule and (W∗1,W∗2)
are the minimax strategies from the primitive φ-game. This proves the theorem.
Example 1. As in Bell and Cover (1980), we let φ(x) := 1[1,∞)(x) be the indicator
function of [1,∞). This turns the payoff kernel into Prob{W1Vt(b) ≥W2Vt(c)}. The
equilibrium amounts to the Kelly rule b∗ = c∗ and the fair exchange of the initial
dollar for a uniform(0, 2) variable. The value of the game is 1/2.
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4 Simulation of a Sample Play of the Game
To illustrate, we use the example of “Shannon’s Demon” in continuous time. In
Shannon’s classic discrete time example, there is cash (that pays no interest) and a
“hot stock” that each period either doubles or gets cut in half in price, each with 50%
probability. The continuous time analog is to set r := 0 and
dSt := σSt
(
σ
2
dt+ dWt
)
, (17)
with σ := log 2 ≈ 0.693. The unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game
is for both players to use the rebalancing rule b∗ := 0.5; the players’ best response
correspondences are plotted in Figure 1. For the sake of argument, assume that
Player 1 behaves correctly, but Player 2 (perhaps confused by the 24% annual drift
rate) chooses to put all his money into the stock, and hold.
Player 1’s wealth at t is exp(0.06t + 0.3465Wt), and Player 2’s wealth at t is
exp(0.693Wt). The expected wealth ratio is exp(0.12t). In Figure 2 we have simulated
a single play of the game, with a horizon of T := 300. At time t, the probability that
Player 1 has more wealth than Player 2 is N(0.173
√
t), where N(•) is the cumulative
normal distribution function. At t := 50, there is an 89% chance that Player 1 has
more wealth. At t := 100 this number rises to 96%.
5 The General Stochastic Differential Game
Finally, we show that the restriction to constant rebalancing rules entails no loss of
generality. We do this below for the one-stock case; the proof for several stocks is
similar. Let M1t and M2t be the wealths of the numerator and denominator player,
respectively. We now allow the players’ portfolios to depend on the most general
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Figure 1: The best response correspondences b∗(c) and c∗(b) that obtain
for the parameter values r := 0, σ := log 2,and µ := σ2/2.
state vector, which is (St, t,M1t,M2t). Player 1’s trading strategy is now denoted
b(S, t,M1,M2), and Player 2’s strategy is c(S, t,M1,M2). We show that in equilib-
rium, both players still adhere to the constant rebalancing rule b(S, t,M1,M2) =
c(S, t,M1,M2) := (µ− r)/σ2.
First, assume that the denominator player uses the Kelly rule c := (µ − r)/σ2.
We show that the numerator player’s best response is to use the same control policy.
Let J(S, t,M1,M2) be the numerator player’s maximum value function. His HJB
equation is
− ∂J
∂t
= max
b∈R
{
µS
∂J
∂S
+ [r + b(µ− r)]M1 ∂J
∂M1
+ [r + c(µ− r)]M2 ∂J
∂M2
+
σ2
2
S2
∂2J
∂S2
+
b2σ2
2
M21
∂2J
∂M21
+
c2σ2
2
M22
∂2J
∂M22
+ bσ2SM1
∂2J
∂S∂M1
+ cσ2SM2
∂2J
∂S∂M2
+ bcσ2M1M2
∂2J
∂M1∂M2
}
. (18)
The boundary condition is J(S, T,M1,M2) := M1/M2. We guess that J(S, t,M1,M2) ≡
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Figure 2: Simulation of one play of the game (b := 0.5 and c := 1), for
the parameter values r := 0, σ := log 2, µ := σ2/2, T := 300.
M1/M2, which obviously satisfies the boundary condition. Under this guess, Player
1’s HJB equation simplifies to
max
b∈R
(µ− r − σ2c)(b− c) = 0, (19)
where c := (µ − r)/σ2. This value of c makes the maximand identically 0, so of
course b∗ := c is a maximizer. Thus, substitution of J ≡M1/M2 has turned the HJB
equation into an identity. This proves that the numerator player’s best response to
the Kelly rule is to play the Kelly rule himself.
We can repeat the above calculation, this time assuming that the numerator
player’s policy is b(S, t,M1,M2) ≡ (µ−r)/σ2. Using J again to denote the denomina-
tor player’s (minimum) value function, we get the same HJB equation and boundary
condition, except that max
b∈R
{•} is replaced by min
c∈R
{•}. We again make the guess
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J ≡M1/M2, which turns Player 2’s HJB equation into the identity
min
c∈R
(µ− r − σ2c)(b− c) = 0. (20)
The unique minimizer is c = b = (µ− r)/σ2. This completes the proof that the con-
stant control policies b(S, t,M1,M2) = c(S, t,M1,M2) = (µ−r)/σ2 are best responses
to each other. The proof for several stocks is similar, except that (µ− r− σ2c)(b− c)
is replaced by (µ− r1− Σc)′(b− c).
6 Conclusion
For the continuous time two-person trading game whereby Player 1 seeks to maximize
the expected ratio of his wealth to that of Player 2 (and Player 2 seeks to minimize
this ratio), the unique Nash equilibrium is for both players to use the (possibly lever-
aged) Kelly rebalancing rule b∗ := Σ−1(µ− r1). More generally, we showed that the
Kelly rule is the basis for the solution of a “continuous-time investment φ-game” that
is the analog of the discrete time version solved by Bell and Cover (1980, 1988). For
practically any criterion φ{W1Vt(b)/(W2Vt(c))} of short-term relative performance,
the correct behavior is for both players to use the Kelly rule b∗ = c∗ in conjunction
with appropriate fair randomizations (W∗1,W
∗
2) of the initial dollar. Thus, the con-
tinuous time Kelly rule (which is renowned for its optimal asymptotic growth rate)
is desirable even for a trader whose goal is to perform well relative to other traders
over very short periods of time.
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